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  T
he World Health Organization 
recently stated the following: 
“Since 2003, the world has 
moved closer to a[n] [inﬂ  uenza] 
pandemic than at any time since 1968” 
[1]. Inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) viruses have 
reached high prevalence in both 
domesticated and wild birds in several 
parts of Asia [2]; the virus has spread 
over an area ranging from Romania 
to Indonesia, possibly carried over this 
distance by migratory waterfowl [3]. 
Over 160 human cases, about half of 
them fatal, have occurred [4], from 
Indonesia to Turkey. These trends 
suggest an increasing risk that the virus 
may acquire the ability to transmit 
efﬁ  ciently from human to human, 
equipping it to cause a new pandemic. 
    Multiple measures are required 
to prevent such a pandemic and, if 
these fail, to detect it, check its spread, 
and mitigate its effects. Attention has 
recently focused on the possibility of 
containing a pandemic in its earliest 
phases at its source, using antiviral 
drugs, before global spread occurs. 
Two recent studies [5,6] concluded 
that containment might work, under 
certain assumptions. First, the strain 
must be only moderately transmissible, 
with a basic reproductive number of 
1.8 or less. In other words, this means 
that containment is likely to work only 
if each individual infected with the 
pandemic strain infects an average of 
1.8 or fewer additional individuals. 
If such a strain emerged, the models 
suggest, containment would require 
that several further conditions also 
be met: the emerging pandemic is 
detected within the ﬁ  rst 20 cases [6] 
or 7–21 days [5]; thereafter, antiviral 
prophylaxis is delivered efﬁ  ciently to 
a geographic area (e.g., to an area 
with a ten kilometer radius) around 
90% of clinical cases within two days 
of symptom onset; the strain remains 
susceptible to oseltamivir (a growing 
concern following reports of partially 
and fully resistant strains among recent 
H5N1 cases [7,8]); and adequate 
antiviral supplies (between 100,000 and 
3 million courses) are available. 
    Even if these conditions are met 
and the next introduction of a 
pandemic-capable strain is contained, a 
containment policy alone is unlikely to 
prevent a pandemic entirely. We argue 
here that if a single introduction of a 
pandemic-capable strain is expected, 
multiple introductions should also be 
expected. Each containment effort 
would likely be more difﬁ  cult than the 
last as manpower, antiviral stockpiles, 
and other scarce resources become 
depleted. Even if each successive 
containment effort is no more difﬁ  cult 
than its predecessor, the chance of 
at least one failure increases with the 
number of introductions. At best, a 
containment policy will only postpone 
the emergence of a pandemic, “buying 
time” to prepare for its effects. 
    In this article, we consider the risk 
of multiple introductions and its 
implications for pandemic planning.
    How Likely Are Multiple 
Introductions?
    Since the last pandemic nearly 40 
years ago, we have observed dramatic 
changes in social and ecological factors 
thought to facilitate emergence of 
a pandemic-capable strain. Surging 
human and bird populations in Asia 
have increased the frequency of contact 
between birds and humans—and these 
changes might facilitate emergence by 
permitting “crossing over” of a mutated 
avian inﬂ  uenza to humans, or by 
allowing human and avian inﬂ  uenzas 
to reassort in the same animal host. 
Already, the cases of human infection 
with avian inﬂ  uenzas are mounting. 
From 2003 to February 2, 2006, 
there have been 161 documented 
cases of and 86 deaths due to highly 
pathogenic H5N1 avian inﬂ  uenza 
infections in humans [4]. Serologic 
evidence indicates that humans 
have been infected with many types 
of avian inﬂ  uenzas [9], not just the 
easily ascertained, highly pathogenic 
H5N1. Though each human case 
of avian inﬂ  uenza, acquired from a 
bird exposure, has a low probability 
of creating a virus strain capable of 
pandemic spread, H5N1 inﬂ  uenza 
has probably spread from human to 
human within one family [10], and 
several additional cases may also have 
involved human-to-human transmission 
[11]. In considering the overall risk 
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that a pandemic strain will emerge in 
a particular time period, the relevant 
ﬁ  gure is not the risk that a single 
infection will lead to a pandemic, 
but the probability that any of the 
human or animal cases occurring over 
that period will give rise to a strain 
capable of sustained human-to-human 
transmission and that the strain will 
begin spreading in people. 
    If a pandemic-capable H5N1 
strain emerges once in humans and 
is contained, is it likely to emerge 
again? One might hope to look to 
history for evidence on this question. 
Genetic evidence of multiple 
reassortment events or mutations 
early in the 1968 H3N2 pandemic 
[12] is consistent with the possibility 
of multiple introductions, but does 
not demonstrate this conclusively. We 
are not aware of such evidence for 
other pandemics, none of which were 
contained. However, one might expect 
that if multiple introductions did occur 
but none were contained, the evidence 
for such introductions might be 
difﬁ  cult to detect because of depletion 
of susceptible hosts by the ﬁ  rst 
uncontained introduction, competitive 
exclusion by the most transmissible of 
the introduced strains, or other factors.
    When a strain emerges in one locale, 
the fundamental processes of bird-to-
bird and bird-to-human transmission 
that generate introductions need 
not change elsewhere. Thus, a single 
emergence may neither increase nor 
decrease the chance that another 
emergence will happen the next day 
or week, nearby or in another country. 
Under the assumption that the risk 
(or hazard) of emergence remains 
constant over time, if one introduction 
is likely in a given period, then multiple 
introductions are also likely. Figure 
1 shows the relationship between the 
risks of zero, one, or more than one 
introduction under the constant hazard 
assumption (which generates a Poisson 
distribution of introductions in a given 
period). As the expected number of 
introductions in a given period, which 
we call   v  , increases from zero, the 
likelihood of a single introduction also 
rises (along with the likelihood of more 
than one); as it increases further, a 
single introduction becomes less likely 
and multiple introductions more likely. 
    More plausibly, one might expect 
that the ﬁ  rst introduction is likely to 
occur because something has changed 
in the virus circulating in birds: the 
avian strain has increased in prevalence 
in a particular area [2,3,13], spread to 
new geographic areas [2], or evolved 
in such a way that it is better suited 
to human transmission [14]. This last 
scenario—that the virus could evolve 
within birds to a form that is capable of 
pandemic transmission in humans—
has recently become more plausible 
given evidence that the 1918 pandemic 
H1N1 strain was transferred from birds 
to humans without reassortment [15]. 
If the hazard of introductions depends 
on any of these factors, then observing 
a single introduction would signal 
that the risk of further introductions 
had increased substantially, and 
introductions would be clustered. 
Under either assumption, if we believe 
an introduction is likely, then we must 
also expect a high risk of multiple 
introductions. 
  Quantifying  the  Beneﬁ  t of 
a Containment Policy Given 
the Possibility of Multiple 
Introductions
    The beneﬁ  t of a containment policy 
can be deﬁ  ned as the expected increase 
in the time to a pandemic achieved by 
the policy. The realized beneﬁ  ts—in 
terms of lives and dollars saved—will 
depend heavily on the available 
resources and technology, the level 
of pandemic preparedness, and the 
timeliness of action. Importantly, the 
window of opportunity provided by 
postponing a pandemic must be wide 
enough to successfully implement 
procedures that reduce the risk of a 
pandemic (e.g., poultry culling and 
prevention of bird–human contact), to 
produce effective vaccines (sufﬁ  cient 
for those at risk of severe outcomes, 
at a minimum, and/or sufﬁ  cient for 
blocking sustained transmission) and to 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030135.g001
  Figure 1.   Probabilities of Zero, One, or Two or More Events (Introductions of a Pandemic-
Capable Strain) When the Expected Number of Events Ranges from Zero to Ten, under a 
Constant Hazard (Poisson Distribution)
      Note that if the expected number of events   (v)  is more than 1.26, then it is more likely that two or 
more events will occur than that exactly one event will occur.  
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030135.g002
  Figure 2.   Expected Gain in Time to a 
Pandemic     (G)   of a Containment Policy 
as a Function of the Expected Time to 
Introduction     (T)   of a Pandemic-Capable 
Strain 
   Either  inﬁ  nite containment attempts (blue) are 
possible or only a single containment attempt 
(red) is possible, and we assume an optimistic 
(80%, solid) or pessimistic (50%, dashed) 
probability of success for each containment. 
  G  is deﬁ  ned as the difference in the expected 
time to a pandemic under the status quo and 
the containment policy. The Poisson hazard 
of introduction of pandemic-capable strains 
  (λ)  is the reciprocal of the expected time to 
introduction   (T) . The results are identical if the 
hazard of introduction is ﬁ  xed but unknown. 
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prepare populations and their health 
systems for the expected onslaught of 
inﬂ  uenza cases. 
    The expected gain in time to a 
pandemic   (G)   depends on several 
parameters (Text S1 contains 
additional supporting methodology 
and results). The ﬁ  rst parameter is 
the expected time to introduction 
of a pandemic-capable strain   (T)  . 
In the simplest case, where the risk 
of introduction at each moment 
(the hazard) remains ﬁ  xed, the 
expected time to introduction   (T)   is 
1/λ, where λ is the rate at which we 
expect pandemic-capable strains to 
be introduced. Secondly, the gain 
in time from a containment policy 
depends on whether such a policy 
equipped us for an indeﬁ  nite number 
of containment attempts, each with the 
same probability of success (a probably 
unachievable extreme), or whether, 
at the other extreme, only the ﬁ  rst 
introduction can be contained. A third 
factor affecting the gain is whether we 
believe λ, the hazard of introduction 
of a pandemic strain, is constant over 
time, or whether λ is increasing due to 
changes in factors such as the genetic 
make-up of avian inﬂ  uenza strains, 
the contact rate between humans and 
birds, or the number of infected birds 
available to contact humans.
    Figure 2 considers the simplest case, 
where the hazard λ remains ﬁ  xed over 
time, and shows how the expected 
gain in time to a pandemic depends 
on the expected time to introduction 
  (T   = 1/λ  )  , the ability to contain 
multiple pandemic-capable strains, 
and the success probability for each 
containment attempt   (c)  . The solid 
blue line shows the most optimistic 
assumptions—unlimited capacity to 
respond to multiple introductions 
and an 80% success probability of 
containment (Figure 2, solid blue line). 
The most effective containment policy 
considered in Ferguson et al. [6] (i.e., 
“drug sparing” antiviral prophylaxis 
combined with school closing and area 
quarantine) had an efﬁ  cacy of 90% 
or more against an inﬂ  uenza strain 
that is less transmissible than previous 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza strains [16,17], 
conditional on the assumptions of the 
model (adequate and timely response, 
introduction in a rural area, oseltamivir 
sensitivity, etc.) being met. We consider 
80% success probability to be optimistic 
after taking into account the risk that 
one or more of these conditions would 
not be met in any given introduction.
    In these circumstances, the expected 
increase in the time to a pandemic 
is greater than the expected time 
to a pandemic in the absence of 
containment. For example, if the 
expected time to a pandemic is one 
year in the absence of containment, 
the expected gain of an 80% successful 
containment policy is four years, 
assuming that containment can be 
implemented an indeﬁ  nite number of 
times. However, if the probability of 
successful containments is less than or 
equal to 50% (Figure 2, dashed blue 
line) or if only the ﬁ  rst pandemic-
capable strain can be contained, 
regardless of the success probability 
(Figure 2, red lines), the expected 
gain will be less than or equal to 
the expected time to a pandemic. If 
the expected waiting time until the 
occurrence of a pandemic is one year, 
the expected gain of a 50% successful 
“one shot” containment policy would 
be only six months. Thus, under 
most circumstances, a containment 
policy will (in expectation) “buy” no 
more than the expected time to the 
pandemic. If the expected waiting time 
until the occurrence of a pandemic is 
ﬁ  ve years, under realistic assumptions, 
the expected gain might be on the 
order of one or two years. Without 
prior planning and investment, this 
gain would be insufﬁ  cient to effect 
change. 
  Containment  Provides  Smaller 
Beneﬁ  ts if the Hazard of 
Introduction Is Increasing
    Thus far, we have assumed a ﬁ  xed 
hazard of introduction. A number 
of social, ecological, or evolutionary 
changes in the virus could cause 
escalation of the hazard over time, 
either in an abrupt or in a gradual 
fashion. First, as the avian epidemic 
progresses, the virus could undergo 
genetic change in birds, with the side 
consequence of more effective spread 
in humans. Even relatively small 
changes that allow only short chains of 
chance transmission in humans might 
dramatically increase the probability of 
disease emergence by allowing the virus 
time to evolve to human transmission 
[18]. In addition to genetic change 
in the virus population circulating in 
birds, simple ecological changes, such 
as increased prevalence of the infection 
in birds, could also lead to gradual 
increases in the hazard of introduction 
with time.
    The beneﬁ  ts of containment 
decrease if we face a growing hazard 
of introduction, regardless of whether 
this growth is abrupt or gradual (see 
Text S1 for details). Suppose that we 
believe the hazard of introduction of 
a pandemic-capable strain is at some 
level, λ  0 , now but may escalate to a 
higher level, λ  1 , in the future (Figure 
3). We call the ratio of these rates 
  (  λ  1 / λ  0)   the effect of escalation   (  ε  )  , 
where escalation may be caused by any 
number of genetic, environmental, and 
social changes that might precipitate 
a relatively rapid increase in the rate 
of introduction of a pandemic-capable 
strain. Escalation itself is assumed to 
occur with some hazard rate   (  λ  E)  . The 
relative magnitude of the escalation 
hazard is the ratio of the hazard of 
escalation to the initial hazard of 
introduction   (  λ  E /λ  0)  , which we call ρ 
(see Text S1).
    Figure 4 shows how the gain in 
time to a pandemic depends on 
the expected time to introduction. 
We plot the relative gain in time to 
a pandemic   (G/T)  , deﬁ  ned as the 
expected gain   (G)   divided by the 
expected time to a pandemic in the 
absence of containment   (T)  , against 
the effect of escalation   (  ε  )  , assuming 
a range of relative magnitudes of the 
escalation hazard   (ρ)   and a 50%–
success probability containment policy 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030135.g003
  Figure 3.   Schematic Diagram of the 
Escalating Hazard of Introduction Model 
with Time on the Horizontal Axis and 
Hazard of Introduction of a Pandemic-
Capable Strain on the Vertical Axis
      The initial hazard of introduction   (λ0)  increases 
to a higher hazard of introduction   (λ1)  at a 
rate determined by the hazard of escalation 
  (λE) . The expected time of escalation is 
the reciprocal of the hazard of escalation. 
The effect of escalation on the hazard of 
introduction is measured by the ratio of the 
ﬁ  nal to the initial hazards of introduction   (ε = 
λ1/λ0) . 
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that can be implemented an inﬁ  nite 
number of times. In the limiting case 
where there is no escalation (i.e., ρ = 
0), the results are identical to Figure 2 
for a 50%–success probability inﬁ  nite-
attempts containment policy: the slope 
of the expected time to introduction 
  (T)   versus expected gain in time to 
introduction   (G)   curve (Figure 2, 
dashed red line) is equal to the relative 
gain under the same containment 
policy   (G/T  , Figure 4A, dotted line). 
As the relative magnitude of the 
escalation hazard increases (Figure 4A, 
short-dashed, long-dashed, and solid 
line), the relative gain falls below one. 
The depression in the relative gain is 
greater when the effect of escalation is 
large and when the relative magnitude 
of the escalation hazard is high because 
escalation would be expected in the 
foreseeable future, though it may not 
occur before the ﬁ  rst introduction. 
When the relative magnitude of the 
escalation hazard is extremely high 
(Figure 4B), escalation is expected 
prior to any introduction, and the 
relative gain approaches one. Similar 
results are obtained for a containment 
policy when only one containment 
effort is achievable (with the relative 
gain bounded by the success probability 
  [c]   and for the situation when the 
growth of the hazard of introduction 
is gradual, see Text S1). Thus, the 
relative gain of a containment policy 
is maximized for a limited set of 
parameter values: when the hazard 
of escalation is extremely slow or 
extremely fast relative to the initial 
hazard of introduction, and when the 
effect of escalation is quite small. Even 
under these assumptions, however, the 
relative gain does not exceed one.
  Conclusions  and  Policy 
Implications
    We conclude that the beneﬁ  t of a 
strategy to contain pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
at its source will be to postpone 
the time to the next pandemic, not 
to prevent a pandemic from ever 
occurring. If at least one containment 
attempt of an introduced pandemic-
capable strain will be necessary, it 
is likely that multiple containment 
attempts will be necessary. Richard 
Danzig has made a similar point about 
preparations for bioterrorist events. 
Because terrorists using biological 
agents could “reload” with relative ease 
and strike multiple times in multiple 
locations, Danzig cautions that we 
should “plan to defend against a 
campaign, not an isolated attack” [19]. 
    Even if we had the capacity (i.e., 
stockpiles, resources, and manpower) 
to undertake multiple containment 
attempts, each introduction of a 
pandemic-capable strain offers a new 
chance for containment to fail, and 
subsequent introductions would likely 
be harder to contain than the ﬁ  rst. 
Thus, containment is likely to “buy” 
time, but the amount of time will 
depend on the capacity for multiple 
containment attempts and the success 
probability of any given containment 
attempt, among other factors. 
    For most realistic scenarios, 
containment provides only a small 
expected gain in time to a pandemic. 
The expected gain is generally less 
than the expected time to the next 
pandemic. Because of its potentially 
limited impact, we therefore conclude 
that containment should not form the 
centerpiece of a pandemic control 
policy. Moreover, to maximize the 
beneﬁ  ts of any delay achieved by 
containment, any containment plan 
should include an additional action 
plan to be implemented rapidly 
and concurrently with the ﬁ  rst 
containment attempt. Central to 
this action plan should be a series of 
measures to drastically reduce the risk 
of introduction of a pandemic-capable 
strain, including widespread culling of 
exposed or potentially exposed poultry 
and changes in agricultural practices 
to reduce ongoing risk of exposure 
[20]. Signiﬁ  cant poultry culling in and 
around the site of introduction would 
shrink the animal reservoir population 
and would limit bird–human contact. 
Culling in more distant sites would be 
warranted if the pandemic-capable 
strain or related strains were widely 
distributed. Vaccination of avian 
populations might be an option in 
areas where the risk is less, or where 
culling is not practical. Such measures, 
the most extreme of which may not 
be politically or economically viable 
at present, would take on additional 
urgency and perhaps become possible 
following the introduction, and 
successful containment, of a pandemic-
capable strain. 
    Preventing further introductions by 
reducing the hazard of introduction 
would enhance the beneﬁ  ts of a 
containment policy in two ways. As 
the hazard of introduction decreases 
and the expected time between 
introductions increases, the gain in 
time to a pandemic would increase. 
Furthermore, the number and success 
probability of future containment 
attempts would increase, since there 
would be additional time to replenish 
resources and improve containment 
plans.
    The ﬁ  rst successful containment 
attempt must also trigger accelerated 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030135.g004
  Figure 4.   Relative Gain in Time to a Pandemic     (G/T)   as a Function of the Effect of Escalation 
on the Hazard of Introduction     (ε = λ1/λ0)  , Assuming Inﬁ  nite Containment Attempts with 50% 
Success Probability Are Possible
      Each curve corresponds to a 10-fold increase in the magnitude of the escalation hazard relative to 
the initial hazard of introduction   (ρ = λE/λ0) , ranging from 0.1 to 10 (A, short-dashed, long-dashed, 
and solid lines), and from 100 to 100,000 (B, dotted, short-dashed, long-dashed, and solid lines). 
When the relative magnitude of the escalation hazard is zero (A, dotted line), the relative gain in 
time to a pandemic is identical to the simple Poisson process in Figure 2. 
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preparations for an uncontained 
pandemic. It is especially critical 
to accelerate development, testing, 
and licensing of vaccines that can be 
produced in sufﬁ  cient quantities to 
immunize whole populations in the 
event of a pandemic. In addition, it is 
imperative that preparations are made 
at the national, state, and city level 
to cope with the health, social, and 
economic effects of a severe pandemic. 
These and other strategies to increase 
preparedness require a substantial lead 
time before they can substantially affect 
the impact of a pandemic. 
    Of course, we might never have 
the opportunity to implement any of 
these responses; the ﬁ  rst containment 
attempt might fail. Therefore, if we 
identify measures that would be useful 
following a successful containment 
effort, there is likely to be a strong 
case for implementing those measures 
now, rather than waiting until the ﬁ  rst 
introduction of a pandemic strain. 
    Containment at the source 
of introduction should thus be 
considered only one part of a 
multipronged strategy that includes 
vaccine development, improved 
surveillance and public health 
response capabilities, deployment of 
measures to reduce the likelihood 
of introduction (especially after the 
ﬁ  rst introduction), and detailed 
planning for measures to mitigate the 
health, social, and economic impact 
of a pandemic. In emphasizing the 
need for a multifaceted approach, 
we echo the recommendations of 
international organizations [1,20] and 
of the original modeling studies of 
containment, which emphasized the 
need for better surveillance [6] and the 
value of vaccination [5] in concert with 
containment efforts. 
    If preparation for a potential 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic is an important 
public health goal, as most experts 
agree it should be, substantial 
investments and planning are 
needed to maximize the beneﬁ  ts of a 
containment policy and to minimize 
the deleterious consequences of the 
next inﬂ  uenza pandemic.  
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